Abstract. ALPHA-MAC is a MAC function which uses the building blocks of AES. This paper studies the internal structure of this new design. First, we provide a method to find second preimages based on the assumption that a key or an intermediate value is known. The proposed searching algorithm exploits the algebraic properties of the underlying block cipher and needs to solve eight groups of linear functions to find a second preimage. Second, we show that our idea can also be used to find internal collisions under the same assumption. We do not make any claims that those findings in any way endanger the security of this MAC function. Our contribution is showing how algebraic properties of AES can be used for analysis of this MAC function.
Introduction
Hash functions play an important role in many areas of cryptography. The building of hash functions has received extensive work over the years, for example, the design of MD4 [17] , MD5 [18] , SHA-0 [3] and SHA-1 [2] . On the other hand, the cryptanalysis of hash functions has been carried out by many researchers, for instance, recent attacks on MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 [6, 7, 10, 14, [19] [20] [21] [22] .
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are keyed hash functions that provide message integrity by appending a cryptographic checksum to a message which is verifiable only by the intended recipient of the message. Message authentication is one of the most important ways of ensuring the integrity of information, and it has been used in many practical applications. MAC functions take a secret key and a message as input and generate a short digest as output. Many research groups have presented various approaches to construct MAC functions, for example, MAA [13] , CBC-MAC [15] , UMAC [9] , MDx-MAC [16] and HMAC [4, 5] .
The ALRED [11] construction is a new MAC design approach presented at FSE 2005. ALPHA-MAC [11] is a specific instance of the ALRED construction with AES [1] as the underlying block cipher. The reason why AES was chosen as the underlying block cipher of the ALPHA-MAC is because AES is efficient in hardware and software and it has withstood intense public scrutiny since its publication as Rijndael [12] .
In this paper, we study the internal structure of the ALPHA-MAC by employing the algebraic properties of AES and the structural features of the ALPHA-MAC. First, we present a method to find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC by solving eight groups of linear functions, based on the assumption that an authentication key or an intermediate value of this MAC is known. Each of these eight groups of linear functions contains two equations. We divide the secondpreimage search algorithm into two steps: the Backwards-aNd-Forwards (BNF) search and the Backwards-aNd-Backwards (BNB) search. The BNF search provides an idea for extending 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions 1 by solving four groups of linear functions. Given a key (or an intermediate value) and one fourblock message, the BNB search can generate another four-block message such that these two messages produce 32-bit collisions, which are a prerequisite for the BNF search. To do the BNB search, we need to solve another four groups of linear functions. By combining the BNB search with the BNF search, we can find second preimages of ALPHA-MAC. Second, we show that the second-preimage finding method can also be used to generate internal collisions. The proposed collision search method can find two five-block messages such that they produce 128-bit collisions under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the ALPHA-MAC, and Section 3 presents the second-preimage search algorithm. Section 4 shows how to generate internal collisions and finally, Section 5 concludes this paper. Appendix A includes our experimental results. Like AES, the ALPHA-MAC round function contains SubBytes (SB), ShiftRows (SR), MixColumns (MC) and AddRoundKey (ARK) , and the output of each injection layout acts as the corresponding 128-bit round key. The message padding method appends a single 1 followed by the minimum number of 0 bits such that the length of the result is a multiple of 32. In the initialization, the state is set to all zeros and AES is applied to the state. For every message word, the chaining method carries out an iteration, and each iteration maps the bits of the message word to an injection input. After that, a sequence of AES round functions are applied to the state, with the round keys replaced by the injection input. In the final transformation, AES is applied to the state. The MAC tag is the first l m bits of the resulting final state. The length of l m may have any value less than or equal to 128. The ALPHA-MAC function is depicted in Figure 1 . 
The Second-Preimage Search Algorithm
The proposed second-preimage search algorithm aims to find a five-block secondpreimageM for a selected five-block message M , under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) in this section.
The second-preimage search algorithm consists of two steps: the BackwardsaNd-Forwards search and the Backwards-aNd-Backwards search. The BNF search can extend 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions, given two messages M andM which collide on 32 bits, namely Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 , after MC in round y (see Figure 2) . Given a key (or an intermediate value) and one four-block message, the BNB search is able to find another four-block message such that these two messages collide on Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 after MC in Round y. The BNB search generates those 32-bit collisions which are required for the BNF search. By merging the BNB search with the BNF search, we can find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC.
The Backwards-aNd-Forwards Search
The Backwards-aNd-Forwards search has the following form:
Known: 1. a selected key or a selected intermediate value.
2. two four-block messages M (My−3, My−2, My−1, My) andM (My−3, My−2,My−1,My) colliding on 32 bits (Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14) after MC in Round y. Extend: 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions in Round y + 1. Method: solve four groups of linear functions. These four groups of functions are numbered as (1), (2), (3) and (4) in this subsection.
The BNF search assumes that we are able to find two messages M andM , which collide on Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 after MC in round y. Based on the algebraic property of the MixColumns transformation and the structure of ALPHA-MAC, we can extend these 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions within three rounds by solving four groups of linear equations.
Extending 32-bit Collisions to 64-bit Collisions
We use the differential XOR property [8] before and after the MixColumns transformation. −→d
Round y − 2: 
Here, we use R (to replacej 0 ⊕j 0 ), S (to replacej 8 ⊕j 8 ), T (to replacej 2 ⊕j 2 ) and U (to replacej 10 ⊕ j 10 ) so that after the MC transformation in Round y, Bytess 1 ⊕ s 1 ,s 3 ⊕ s 3 ,s 9 ⊕ s 9 ands 11 ⊕ s 11 become zero. Now the question is "how to decide R, S, T and U ". The answer is:
-There exists one and only one pair of (R, T ) such that after MC, Bytes s 1 ⊕ s 1 ands 3 ⊕ s 3 are both zero. -There exists one and only one pair of (S, U ) such that after MC, Bytes s 9 ⊕ s 9 ands 11 ⊕ s 11 are both zero.
According to the MC transformation, we have the following formula: 
To find out the values of (R, T ) and (S, U ), we need to solve the following two groups of equations.
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In the two equations in (1), there are two variables R and T , and therefore there exists one and only one pair of (R, T ) to make these two equations hold simultaneously. Similarly, we can decide the values of S and U by solving the two equations in (2). Once we get the values of R, S, T and U , message blockM y−1 can be constructed as follows: 
Extending 64-bit Collisions to 96-bit Collisions
We only need to focus on Round y and Round y + 1 to extend 64-bit collisions to 96-bit collisions. The idea is to choose message blockM y to cancel out the differences between Bytes (s 5 , s 13 , s 7 , s 15 ) and Bytes (s 5 ,s 13 ,s 7 ,s 15 ) in Round y. The method of choosingM y is exactly same as the method for constructingM y−1 in Section 3.1.1.
By taking the outputs of ARK in Round y, we perform the SB and SR operations, and then XOR the results after SB and SR: Here we use π to replace n 0 ⊕ñ 0 , ρ to replace n 8 ⊕ñ 8 , φ to replace n 2 ⊕ñ 2 and ω to replace n 10 ⊕ñ 10 so that after MixColumns in Round y + 1, Bytes w 1 ⊕w 1 , w 9 ⊕w 9 , w 3 ⊕w 3 and w 11 ⊕w 11 are zero:
Now the question is "how to decide π, ρ, φ and ω". The answer is:
-There exists one and only one pair of (π, φ) such that after MC, Bytes w 1 ⊕w 1 and w 3 ⊕w 3 are both zero. The values of (π, φ) can be decided by solving (3).
-There exists one and only one pair of (ρ, ω) such that after MC, Bytes w 9 ⊕w 9 and w 11 ⊕w 11 are both zero. By solving (4), we get the values of (ρ, ω).
Once we know the values of π, φ, ρ and ω, message blockM y can be chosen as follows: 
Extending 96-bit Collisions to 128-bit Collisions
This step is straightforward as we can select message M y+1 arbitrarily, and construct messageM y+1 to cancel the differences between Bytes w 0 , w 8 , w 2 and w 10 . The construction is provided as follows:
The Backwards-aNd-Backwards Search
The Backwards-aNd-Backwards search has the following form:
2. one selected four-block message M (My−3, My−2, My−1, My). Find:
another four-block messageM (My−3,My−2,My−1,My) such that these two messages collide on 32 bits (Bytes s4, s12, s6 and s14) after MC in Round y. Method: solve four groups of linear functions. These four groups of functions are named as (5), (6), (7) and (8) in this subsection.
We propose a method to find 32-bit collisions on Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 (see Figure 2 ) by solving four groups of linear functions. This search assumes that for a selected key (or a selected intermediate value) and a selected four-block message (M y−3 , M y−2 , M y−1 , M y ), we can generate another four-block message (M y−3 ,M y−2 ,M y−1 ,M y ) such that these two messages collide on Bytes s 4 , s 12 , s 6 and s 14 after MC in Round y. The method used by the BNB search is similar to the idea employed by the BNF search, but works in only one direction (i.e., only backwards).
Deciding Four
Values (j 5 ,j 7 ,j 13 andj 15 ) In the beginning, we choose (M y−3 ,M y−2 ,M y−1 ,M y ) randomly. Assume that the input and the output of MC in Round y are listed as follows: 
Now the question is "how can we make this happen". Our answer is to solve two groups of linear functions. For the values of s 4 and s 6 , we have two linear equations in (5) with only two unknown variables (j 5 andj 7 ). Therefore, we can solve (5) to obtain the values ofj 5 andj 7 .
Similarly, for the values of s 12 and s 14 , we have two linear functions in (6) with two unknown variables (j 13 andj 15 ). We can solve (6) to decide the values of j 13 andj 15 . After getting four values (j 5 ,j 7 ,j 13 , andj 15 ) decided, we perform the SR −1 and SB −1 transformations. As SR −1 is permutation and SB −1 is substitution,j 5 ,j 7 ,j 13 , andj 15 are first relocated then substituted by another four valuesĩ 9 ,ĩ 3 ,ĩ 1 , andĩ 11 , respectively. As the message injection layout does not change the values ofĩ 9 ,ĩ 3 ,ĩ 1 , andĩ 11 , these four values are not changed after we do ARK. So, we get four known values (ĩ 9 ,ĩ 3 ,ĩ 1 , andĩ 11 ) after MC in Round y − 1. Our next target is to modify message blockM y−2 so that we get those four valuesĩ 9 ,ĩ 3 ,ĩ 1 , andĩ 11 after MC in Round y − 1.
Modifying Message BlockM y−2
Suppose by using the original message blockM y−2 , we have the following states in Round y − 1: ) with (h 0 ,h 2 ,h 8 ,h 10 ) and then we get those four values (ĩ 9 ,ĩ 3 ,ĩ 1 , andĩ 11 ) located as follows:
Based on the property of MC transformation, we can form the following two groups of linear functions:
We know the values ofh 1 ,h 3 ,h 9 andh 11 from the original message block M y−2 . We can get the values of (h 0 ,h 2 ) by solving (7), and get the values of (h 8 ,h 10 ) by solving (8 
Combining the BNB Search with the BNF Search
The second-preimage search algorithm combines the BNB search with the BNF search. To search for a second preimage of the ALPHA-MAC, we perform the following steps:
1. Select a key or an intermediate value.
Select a five-block message
We need to guarantee thatM y−3 is not equal to M y−3 . 4. Perform the BNB search to generate 32-bit collisions. The BNB search is done by modifying message blockM y−2 . 5. Use the BNF search to extend those 32-bit collisions to 128-bit collisions.
The BNF search is carried out by modifying the values ofM y−1 ,M y , and
The routine of finding second preimages is shown in Table 1 , and Figure  3 depicts this finding. The name of the BNB search comes from the fact that searching forM y−2 is carried out by moving backwards and then backwards, and the name of the BNF search comes from the fact that searching forM y−1 , M y andM y+1 is performed by moving backwards and then forwards (see Table   1 ). A personal computer takes about 1 second to find a second preimage of the ALPHA-MAC. In Appendix A, we provide a second preimage of a selected key and a selected five-block message. In the second-preimage search, we choose the first five-block message arbitrarily, and once it is decided, we do not modify it. All we need to do is modify the second five-block message so that 128-bit collisions happen. Therefore, the second-preimage search can also be used to find two colliding five-block messages under a selected key (or a selected intermediate value).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented our analysis on the internal structure of ALPHA-MAC. We proposed a method to find second preimages of the ALPHA-MAC by combining the Backwards-aNd-Forwards search and the Backwards-aNdBackwards search, based on the assumption that a key or an intermediate value is My (My) Injection Layout My+1 (My+1) Fig. 3 . The second-preimage search known. Our method employs the algebraic properties of AES and the structural features of the ALPHA-MAC. To find a second preimage of the ALPHA-MAC, our idea needs to solve eight groups of linear functions. We also showed that the second-preimage finding method can be used to generate internal collisions. 
A A Found Second Preimage
For a selected key K (see Table 3 ) and a selected five-block message M (see Table 2 ), a second preimage found by our algorithm isM (shown in Table 2 ). The 128-bit colliding value is listed in Table 4 . Note that these two messages are listed after injection layout. 
